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RETHINKING THE EMERGING POST-WASHINGTON 
CONSENSUS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
 
 
                            Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses* 
 
The objective of the paper is to provide a critical assessment of the emerging 
post-Washington Consensus (PWC), as a new paradigm in the development 
debate. The paper begins by tracing the main record of the Washington 
Consensus,  the set of neoliberal economic policies  propogated foremost by 
key Bretton Woods Institutions like the World Bank and the IMF  that 
penetrated into the economic policy agendas of many developing countries 
since the late 1970s. The paper then outlines the main tenets of the PWC, 
emerging from the shortcomings of that record and the reaction it created in 
the political realm. The paper, while accepting that the PWC provides a 
significant improvement over the Washington Consensus, draws attention to 
its failure to provide a sufficiently broad framework for dealing with key and 
pressing development issues such as income distribution, poverty and self-
sustained growth.  
 
 Introduction  
 
The critical period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s witnessed a major upsurge 
in neo-liberal ideas concerning the development process and development strategy. 
The neo-liberal counter-revolution in development theory represented a major assault 
on national developmentalism in the context of which the state had played an active 
role in the developmental process through such strategies as import-substitution 
industrialization and financial repression. The emerging neo-liberal orthodoxy 
advocated a new development model based on the primacy of individualism, market 
liberalism, outward-orientation, and state contraction. The organizing principle of 
neo-liberal political economy was the notion of a minimal state whose principal role   2  
was confined to that of securing law and order, macroeconomic stability and the 
provision of physical infrastructure.
1 
 
The new orthodoxy identified widespread and excessive state interventionism as the 
primary cause of weak economic progress. The natural implication of this diagnosis 
was to liberate the market from the distorting influences of large public sectors, 
pervasive controls and interventionism. Neo-liberal thinking, in turn, exercised a key 
practical influence on the policy discourse of key Bretton Woods institutions such as 
the IMF and the World Bank. The central tenet of neo-liberal thinking and the 
associated ‘Washington Consensus’ was ‘getting the prices right’. The state, itself, 
was conceived as the problem rather than the solution. The universal policy proposal 
was to pursue a systematic program of decreasing state involvement in the economy 
through trade liberalization, privatization and reduced public spending, freeing key 
relative prices such as interest rates and exchange rates and lifting exchange controls. 
Efficient allocation of resources would be guaranteed by relative prices determined 
through the impersonal forces of the free market. The logical corollary of this line of 
thinking was that the cost of ‘government failures’ arising from rent-seeking and price 
distortions associated with excessive protectionism would always outweigh ‘market 
failures’ associated mostly with imperfect competition and under-provision of public 
goods. Hence, increasingly the Washington Consensus was based on the 
understanding that imperfect markets are always superior to imperfect states.
2 
 
The rise of neo-liberal orthodoxy was in addition supported by a powerful ‘new 
political economy’ that challenged the notion of a benign state which would always 
act in the public interest, an idea that was at the core of structuralist development 
thinking and the associated model of national developmentalism. The political 
economy element embodied in neo-liberal thinking underlined the need to analyze the 
state, not as an abstract institution divorced from the society at large, but as an 
institution dominated by powerful self-maximizing actors such as politicians and 
bureaucrats. The tendency to view the state as a powerful interest group in itself 
meant that the actors concerned could take advantage of the rents associated with 
highly interventionist policies. Self-maximizing politicians and bureaucrats would 
take advantage of their powerful position in society through various forms of 
corruption. This line of reasoning was also used to explain persistence of policies such   3  
as heavy protectionism. Although such policies were against the public interest at 
large, such policies continued to be implemented because they tended numerically 
small, but powerful interest groups such as rent-seeking elements in the private sector 
as well as state officials. A natural implication of this rather bleak view of politics and 
interventionist economic policies was that liberalization and state contraction were 
necessary tools to curb the excessive powers enjoyed by politicians and bureaucrats, a 
process which was regarded as central for rapid and equitable economic growth.
3 
 
By the beginning of 1990s, however, the Washington Consensus itself was under 
serious challenge. The principal objective of the present study is to uncover the forces 
that have progressively undermined the very foundations of the Washington 
Consensus, resulting in the emergence of a new line of thinking in development, 
namely ‘The Post-Washington Consensus’. An attempt will be made to disaggregate 
the principal elements of the new consensus that seems to be emerging within the 
dominant policy establishment in recent years. We do recognize that key elements of 
the emerging ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ (the PWC) constitute progress over the 
naïve postulates of the earlier Washington Consensus that it seeks to transcend. Yet, 
the central criticism posed is that the PWC does not go far enough in overcoming the 
limitations of the neo-liberal policy agenda. Our central contention is that although 
power issues in the domestic and international arena are at stake, these are not 
sufficiently emphasized in the emerging PWC.  
 
The following types of questions assume particular relevance in this respect. Is it 
possible to accomplish significant poverty alleviation without altering the underlying 
asset or wealth distribution? Is it possible to deal effectively with issues regarding 
unemployment, poverty, and the broader and even more challenging distributional 
issues through growth alone without taking into account considerations relating to 
ownership structures? Similarly, is it possible to reform the key Bretton Woods 
institutions, in a meaningful way, without tackling the underlying structure of power 
at the global level? A meaningful encounter with the development issues of the post-
neo-liberal era requires a serious consideration of fundamental questions of this 
nature. 
   4  
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 examines the 
record of the Washington  Consensus and identifies the main factors responsible for 
the increasing criticism that it has drawn since the early 1980s. Section 3 identifies the 
main elements of the PWC, emerging from the criticicism of Washington Consensus. 
Section 4 provides a critical assessment of the PWC, emphasizing its shortcomings in 




The Washington Consensus under Challenge 
 
The hegemonic position of the neo-liberal paradigm has started to encounter serious 
criticisms by the beginning of the 1990s. The growing intellectual challenge to neo-
liberal orthodoxy was based on accumulating empirical evidence that undermined the 
fundamental claim of the Washington consensus that full-scale liberalization at all 
cost is associated with superior economic performance. The following stylized facts 
of development performance in the neo-liberal era deserve particular emphasis in this 
respect. 
 
A highly influential element in the neo-liberal resurgence had involved the 
interpretation of East Asian success. The superior economic performance of Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs) in East Asia not only in the realm of economic 
growth but also in terms of key social indicators was interpreted in such a way as to 
provide strong support for the neo-liberal paradigm. Countries like South Korea and 
Taiwan had, for example, managed to combine outstanding rates of economic growth 
with striking performances in the domains of employment expansion, poverty 
reduction, and income distribution. In the neo-liberal vision, Asian NICs were 
successful because they were less protectionist, more outward-oriented and closer to 
the norms of the free market than their counterparts in other parts of the developing 
world in Latin America and elsewhere.
4 Countries that were heavily dirigist and 
protectionist in their economic policies experienced, on the other hand, not only 
slower rates of economic growth but also higher income inequality and limited 
success in terms of employment expansion and poverty reduction. Such countries also   5  
experienced serious macroeconomic instability and crises which were absent in the 
East Asian context for most of the post-War period.  
 
This kind of dichotomy that marked one of the central pillars of the Washington 
Consensus was seriously challenged by more careful and detailed accounts of East 
Asian success. Institutionalist interpretations of hyper-growth in South Korea and 
Taiwan highlighted the fact that rapid industrialization and export growth was at the 
heart of their superior economic performance. Yet, strong growth and diversification 
of industrial output and exports could not simply be accounted by the logic of the free 
market. Interventionist strategies and an active industrial policy, dictated by 
considerations relating to longer-term competitiveness and dynamic comparative 
advantage, constituted the central elements contributing towards their success.
5 
 
Superficially, these economies seemed to be characterized by a low degree of 
protectionism. Moreover the size of state involvement in the economy appeared to be 
lower than their less successful counterparts elsewhere. But, at the same time, a closer 
investigation revealed that effective state interventionism and an appropriate mix of 
state and the market and import-substitution and export-promotion were key 
ingredients of their superior economic performance. This kind of empirical evidence 
clearly contradicted one of the basic assumptions of neo-liberal political economy that 
interventionist strategies necessarily work against long-term public interest. In 
retrospect, the institutionalist interpretation suggested that the kind of strategies 
adopted in East Asia represented national developmentalism of a different type. It also 
suggested that under certain specific conditions state interventionism can act in public 
interest and play a constructive role in the development process. The record of these 
countries which had been skillfully used to provide empirical backing for neoliberal 
wisdom has thus been instrumental in undermining it in the light of this powerful new 
evidence.  
 
Probing into the empirical landscape further, another piece of evidence that appeared 
to cast doubt about the intellectual underpinnings of the neo-liberal orthodoxy 
concerned the overall growth performance of the world economy. Overall growth in 
the world economy has been strikingly lower and more unstable during the neo-liberal 
era compared to earlier periods. As the gap between developed and less developed   6  
countries widened there was increased divergence within the Third World.
6 For 
example, Latin America in the 1980s and Sub-Saharan Africa throughout the past two 
decades were among the major laggards as opposed to the hyper-growth experienced 
by Asian NICs. A large number of African countries during this period have been 
stagnant or registering negative rates of growth.  Latin American countries, after a 
similar performance in the 1980s, showed signs of recovery thereafter, but only at a 
slow pace. In spite of the fact that both regions had stagnant investment performance 
and experienced deindustrialization, East Asian countries again represented the major 
cases of good performance.
7   
 
Not only has overall growth been lower, but the degree of inequality in the global 
economy appears to have increased during the era of neo-liberal restructuring.
8 With 
regards to poverty the evidence is rather mixed. World Bank estimates show that the 
number of people living on less than one dollar a day has remained almost constant 
during the 1987-99 period while the overall poverty rate on the same basis has 
declined from 28.3 percent to 23.3 percent. Even those who claim that the poverty rate 
has fallen during the period of neo-liberal restructuring concede, however, that this 
record was due mostly to good performance in Asia, particularly China. Excluding 
China, there is an increase in the absolute number of poor people while the fall in the 
poverty rate becomes more modest, declining from 28.5 percent to only 25.0 percent.
9 
In any event, the experience of many countries under neo-liberal reforms, notably the 
cases of Argentina and Turkey, has clearly demonstrated that economic growth per se 
was insufficient to deal with the problem of endemic poverty.
10  
 
There is no doubt that neo-liberal experiments in the developing and the post-
communist world have also been characterized by considerable variation in economic 
performance among different countries as well as among different sub-periods within 
the same country. Countries have also diverged sharply in terms of their ability to 
apply neo-liberal reforms on a sustained basis particularly in the framework of 
nascent democratic institutions.  One should, therefore, guard against simple 
generalizations in this respect. Yet, it is also the case that the application of neo-
liberal principles has produced only a few cases of major success on a sustained basis. 
   7  
Disaggregating economic performance under neo-liberal reforms, premature financial 
and capital account liberalization has arguably constituted the soft spot of Washington 
Consensus. A number of middle income countries or ‘emerging markets’ have been 
encouraged or pressurized by key international institutions to open up their capital 
accounts before  accomplishing a stable macroeconomic environment and 
constructing the necessary regulatory infrastructure over their financial systems.  
Premature exposure to the vagaries of financial globalization has been costly for many 
economies in the semi-periphery. Many countries found themselves trapped on a 
highly fragile growth path based on short-term and highly speculative inflows of 
capital. Reliance on debt-led growth, without paying sufficient attention to the need to 
increase domestic savings and the long-term competitiveness of the real economy and 
the need to establish an adequate regulatory framework for their financial sectors 
rendered such economies increasingly vulnerable to speculative attacks and frequent 
financial crises. Indeed, the very frequency of financial crises primarily, if not 
exclusively, in the developing world has been one of the most striking features of the 
global economic environment in the post-1990 era. What is also striking is that such 
crises have not been confined to certain regions of the developing world, such as Latin 
America, as was the case in the era of import-substitution and national 
developmentalism. Crises occurred not only in Latin America and Eastern Europe, but 
also in East and South-East Asia, regions that were quite successful in avoiding 
financial crises in the past. 
 
The highly volatile capital flows and frequent financial crises associated with under-
regulated financial systems and open capital account regimes have proved to be costly 
in a number of important respects. First, they increasingly undermined the basis of 
sustained economic growth not only at the level of the individual nation state but at 
regional and global levels. A striking characteristic of the new era involved the 
possibility of contagion, with crisis in one country leading to declines in the 
availability of capital flows to countries in other parts of the world through its impact 
on investor perceptions and confidence. This was surely the case following the Asian 
crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998 in the aftermath of which investors were 
much more reluctant in terms of committing funds to the highly risky financial 
environments of the so-called emerging markets. Such an environment clearly 
injected a deflationary bias to the world economy that was costly both for individual   8  
nation states and the workings of the global economy as a whole. Such crises have 
been costly not only in terms of growth but also in terms of their impact on poverty 
and income distribution. In many cases, a disproportionate impact of such crises has 
fallen on the poor and the middle strata of society, with highly negative social 
consequences. 
 
Yet another disturbing feature of the new era involved pervasive state failure in a 
large number of cases with corruption in government emerging as a major sphere of 
concern under neo-liberal reforms.
11 This observation is rather paradoxical in the 
sense that the whole spirit of neo-liberal reforms was predicated on the notion of 
overcoming pervasive rent-seeking and corruption which were diagnosed as natural 
by-products of excessive state intervention in the economy. What happened instead is 
that the liberalization process itself helped to undermine the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of state institutions, helping to create a vacuum and producing an 
environment within which widespread corruption could flourish. Again what is 
striking is that the problem has not been unique to individual countries or regions, but 
manifested itself as a broad, systemic problem which was evident in all parts of the 
developing world. As in the case of financial crises, such examples of state failure 
under neo-liberalism have been counterproductive in the countries concerned not only 
in terms of undermining growth but also in terms of its deep negative impact on 
income distribution, trust and social cohesion
12 
 
Continuing our analysis with variations in growth performance, it is interesting to note 
that some of the most drastic experiments in neo-liberal reforms have ended in failure. 
A typical example that immediately comes to mind in this context is the case of 
Argentina. Argentina, after a period of prolonged stagnation throughout the post-War 
period, embarked upon a far-reaching experiment in neo-liberal economic 
restructuring in the early 1990s. Argentina, through its rigid  adherence to the 
convertibility plan and its institutional counterpart the currency board, in line with the 
advice of the IMF, had considerable success in the early years of the experiment in 
terms of reducing inflation from hyperinflation to single digit levels and engineering a 
massive privatization that helped to attract capital flows on a large scale.
13 By the 
mid-1990s, Argentina under neo-liberal reforms was growing at historically 
unprecedented rates. Not surprisingly the key Bretton Woods institutions singled out   9  
Argentina as a model case that other countries ought to follow and emulate. Yet, the 
kind of fragile, debt-led growth that Argentina was experiencing came to a total 
standstill following the crisis of 2001. The crisis itself had costly consequences and 
has been a source of massive protests. Clearly, we are not in a position to do full 
justice to the Argentine case. What is important for our purposes is that a country that 
appears to be fully committed to the implementation of the neo-liberal agenda, have 
ultimately found itself in the midst of a deep economic crisis with dire social 
consequences. 
 
Indeed, Argentina is not unique in this respect. Turkey is a country that had one of the 
very first encounters with the Washington consensus in 1980. By the mid-1980s, 
Turkey had recovered from a major crisis and found itself on a steady growth path 
based on rapid expansion of exports. Again, it was identified by the principal 
international financial institutions as a model case of successful restructuring.
14 Yet, 
the performance of the Turkish economy has deteriorated in the context of the 1990s, 
notably following the decision to open up the capital account fully in 1989 in the face 
of rising macroeconomic instability and without the necessary regulatory and legal 
safeguards. Turkey has experienced three important crises during the second phase of 
neo-liberal reform which have clearly jeopardized the country’s growth and income 
distribution performance.
15 Currently, the country is trying to recover from the latest 
and deepest of these crises, the crisis of 2001. Clearly, the list of such cases which 
have been initially identified as neo-liberal success stories but whose performances 
have subsequently failed to live up to initial expectations can be extended further.  
 
Finally, another major source of challenge to the Washington Consensus came from 
the observation that the small number of countries achieving high rates of growth in 
recent years have deviated from neo-liberal norms in certain critical respects. China 
and Vietnam, the two hyper-growth cases, have been successful in penetrating into 
export markets on the basis of low wages and attracting large amounts of long-term 
foreign investment. Yet, neither of these two countries has conformed fully to the neo-
classical logic. In fact, selective infant industry protectionism and active industrial 
policy have been key components of the policy package in both of these cases.
16 
India, a country which has been growing rapidly, emerging as one of the few real 
success stories of the recent era, has been liberalizing its trade and capital account  10  
regime but only gradually.
17 Malaysia, another successful case of rapid growth based 
on export-orientation and foreign direct investment has deviated from the norms of 
the Washington consensus in a critical respect, namely through the imposition of 
controls over short-term capital flows. Arguably, such a non-orthodox instrument has 
been helpful in helping to insulate Malaysia from the vagaries of the Asian crisis 
which has proved to be so costly for other countries in the region such as Thailand 
and Indonesia. Chile, widely considered to be the most successful country over time 
during the neo-liberal era, has also deviated from neo-liberal norms by effective state 
involvement in the creation of natural resource based export activities after the mid-
1980s
18  and perhaps more crucially, by maintaining controls over short-term capital 
flows throughout the 1990s.
19 To provide yet another example, Russia, which 
achieved rapid growth following the 1998 crisis, is another country that has only 
partially liberalized its capital account regime. 
  
Extending the list of countries that deviated from the neo-liberal package in some key 
respects further, the more successful countries of economic reform in Eastern Europe, 
notably Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic have rather than simply relying on neo-
liberal reforms benefited from the existence of a double external anchor. The prospect 
of early European Union membership has generated major additional benefits to these 
countries which have provided them considerable leeway in maximizing the gains and 
minimizing the losses associated with neo-liberal reforms. Financial resources 
associated with early accession have strengthened the hand of reformers in such 
economies. Positive signals provided by the EU have also helped these economies to 
attract considerable foreign direct investment. Clearly, such additional incentives have 
been lacking for the remainder of the developing world, a category that includes a 
large segment of the post-communist Eastern Europe as well. Hence, it would be 
misleading to offer these cases as unqualified success stories of neo-liberal reform in 
the sense that they could most probably not have achieved this kind of success in the 
absence of the unusually favorable mix of conditions and incentives associated with 
the prospects of early accession to the EU. 
 
It is also important to draw attention to the fact that the limited number of highly 
successful cases identified above found themselves in a situation of what we could 
describe as a virtuous circle. Arguably, they managed to be successful by deviating  11  
from neo-liberal norms in certain crucial respects. The fact that they were successful 
and could avoid crises meant that they could go on experimenting with heterodox 
instruments without encountering the discipline of international financial institutions. 
Less successful countries like Argentina and Turkey, in contrast, found themselves 
trapped in a vicious circle. The fact that they were too conformist on key aspects of 
neo-liberal reforms such as early capital account liberalization rendered them 
inherently crisis-prone. Once they found themselves in a crisis situation and by 
implication within the straightjacket of a formal IMF program, they were in no 
position to experiment with heterodox policy instruments such as controls over short-
term capital flows.  
 
Other Sources of Challenge to the Washington Consensus: Alternative Sites of 
Resistance 
 
Mounting evidence based on a variety of national cases has clearly helped to 
undermine the intellectual appeal of the neo-liberal policy agenda and the optimism 
associated with the early years of the Washington Consensus. At a more concrete and 
practical level, however, significant challenges have been directed at the prevailing 
neo-liberal orthodoxy at a variety of different platforms. Mounting protests have 
emerged in recent years against the costly social consequences of neo-liberal 
restructuring at local and national levels. The rise of the Zapatista movement and the 
civil war in Mexico in 1994 could be identified as a proto-type local level resistance 
to the regressive redistribution effects of neo-liberal restructuring.
20 At the level of the 
nation state, striking examples of protest include the massive protests in Argentina 
following the crisis of 2001. The Argentine example is certainly not unique. There has 
been widespread protests and riots in countries like Indonesia following the Asian 
crisis. Peru constitutes yet another major case where major protests have been 
mounted against the negative consequences of the neo-liberal reform process. In many 
countries including Turkey social protests have been more sporadic but nevertheless 
present. At a different level, the opposition of certain powerful groups within the 
industrialized countries, headed by trade unions to some important components of 
neo-liberalism such as trade liberalization has no doubt contributed to strengthening 
the challenge to Washington Consensus in much the same way as the Thatcher- 12  
Reagan experiments in the UK and the USA in the early 1980s had reinforced the 
spread of neo-liberal economic policies in the developing countries. 
 
Yet another source of resistance has been at the level of the emerging global civil 
society through the medium of the global Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) 
with the protests at the WTO meetings in Seattle in early 2000 precipitating a 
subsequent wave of similar protests at Prag, Rome, Quebec and elsewhere, targeted 
foremost against the key institutions of neo-liberal globalization such as the IMF; 
World Bank and the WTO. What is interesting about these global NGOs is that they 
exploit the advantages of globalization in the realms of technology and 
communications to present a truly international challenge to neo-liberalism which 
itself is a global phenomenon in any case. Admittedly, the so called ‘anti-
globalization’ or using perhaps a more appropriate term the ‘alternative globalization 
movement’ does not represent a coherent whole or a monolithic bloc with a consistent 
set of demands.
21 The most influential element within this group is the developed 
country NGOs, notably the labor and environmentalist groups from the United States 
which are basically anti-free trade in their orientation. The alternative globalization 
movement also includes significant elements from the ‘south’ which clearly favor 
improved access to developed country markets and technology developed in the north. 
Hence, there is a certain inevitable clash of interest between the interests of different 
components of the movement combining protectionist elements from the north and 
pro-free trade elements from the south, calling for improved access to developed 
country markets. In spite of its inherent ambiguities, organizational weaknesses and 
failure to present a clearly and consistently- defined alternative agenda, the 
significance of the emerging global civil movement against neo-liberalism should not 
be underestimated. 
 
The kind of pressures that we have tried to highlight so far are pressures from the 
periphery or challenges posed from below to the dominant structures and institutions 
of global neo-liberalism. What is interesting in the present context is that an important 
rethinking process has been occurring in recent years within the dominant 
establishment itself. Hence, in addition to pressures originating from below that we 
have already identified, a powerful set of pressures from above have been operating in 
such a way as to modify the underlying edifice of the neo-liberal policy agenda. Both  13  
the World Bank and the IMF in recent years have been trying to respond to serious 
criticisms leveled against global neo-liberalism, notably in the realms of the reform of 
the international financial architecture and the process of poverty alleviation. From 
the very response of these key multilateral institutions one can start to detect the 
salient elements of a Post-Washington Consensus that effectively constitutes a 
synthesis of national developmentalism and the neo-liberal policy agenda itself.  
 
Towards a Post-Washington Consensus: Basic Tenets of the Emerging 
Establishment Perspective 
 
It is possible to discern a noticeable shift in the policy focus of the key Bretton Woods 
institutions in recent years away from a hard-core neo-liberalism to a new kind of 
synthesis which could be described as the emerging Post-Washington Consensus. 
Arguably, the process in this direction started in the World Bank at an earlier stage 
than the IMF. There has been a renewed interest in poverty and governance issues at 
the Bank beginning in the early 1990s.
22 Research and publications, particularly  
influenced by the revisionist accounts of the East Asian success, emphasized the 
importance of institutions and the need to improve the performance of the state as a 
necessary ingredient of market-oriented reforms. Research into the transition 
economies of the post-communist world appeared to provide additional support for 
the claim that institutions matter and the performance of the state need to be improved 
in all kinds of transitional economies. Similarly, there was some recognition at the 
Bank that persistent poverty could not be eliminated simply through the expected 
trickle-down effects of improved efficiency and rising growth. 
 
The IMF tends to be a more enclosed and a less heterogeneous organization, and less 
open to self-criticism compared to the Bank. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that 
serious reform initiatives have come at a later stage in the IMF. The Asian crisis of 
1997 proved to be a decisive turning point in this context. The Fund, for the first time 
in its history, has been confronted with serious criticism from the dominant 
establishment concerning its handling of the crisis. The IMF was accused not only of 
failing to predict the crisis, but also for actually making things worse in the aftermath 
of the crisis. The Asian crisis was also important in terms of producing a serious rift 
between the two Bretton Woods institutions again for the first time for many decades.  14  
Following the rethinking process that has occurred in the Fund, the institution now 
tends to pay far more attention to regulatory reforms, notably in the context of the 
banking and financial system, and recognizes far more than in the past the importance 
of strong institutions and ‘good governance’.
23 
 
The work of the Nobel Prize winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz, who occupied a 
critical position as the chief economist of the World Bank at the time of the Asian 
crisis has been particularly influential in providing the intellectual backbone to the 
emerging PWC. Needless to say it would be wrong to talk about the PWC as a 
monolithic entity. Furthermore, a number of other major figures within the dominant 
academic and policy-making circles of North America have made influential 
contributions in this context. Dani Rodrik, Paul Krugman, Stanley Fischer, William 
Easterly and Ravi Kanbur could also be identified as individuals who have made 




Nevertheless, in trying to present a stylized picture of the PWC, it would be useful to 
focus on the work of Stiglitz for two major reasons. First, as a highly respected 
academic economist and as a key figure at the World Bank his criticisms have carried 
much weight. The IMF, has always been criticized in the past. Yet, the criticisms up 
until the Asian crisis had originated primarily from the ‘periphery’, meaning the 
intellectuals and policy-makers in the Third World or the kind of radical intellectuals 
in the north who were located on the margins of the academic and policy-making 
circles. With the onset of the Asian crisis, however, the IMF, in particular, has been 
subjected to serious criticism, but this time the criticisms originating from the 
‘center’, within the key Bretton Woods institutions. Stiglitz was particularly vocal in 
his criticisms of the IMF and his views, more than of any other economist, has been 
widely publicized.
25 Secondly, in a number of his recent publications he has tried to 
provide a coherent alternative to the basic pillars of the Washington Consensus.
26 
Based on the contributions of Stiglitz, we can provide a concise stylized picture of the 
PWC that has increasingly influenced the overall thinking process of key institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF in recent years.  
  15  
Perhaps the key element of the PWC is the recognition that states have an important 
role to play in the development process. In the simple-minded versions of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy, expanding the domain of the market had necessarily meant reducing the 
domain of the state in the economy. Whilst, the PWC also favors liberalization of the 
economy and greater reliance on the market; states and markets are conceived of as 
complements rather than substitutes. The role of the state in fostering the development 
of the market is considered to be critical in a number of important respects, the 
underlying vision no doubt influenced by the revisionist, institutionalist accounts of 
East Asian success in the pre-crisis era.  
 
In highlighting the activist role of the state in a predominantly open and market-
oriented environment, regulation of the financial system receives particular emphasis 
based on the recognition that excessive risk taking by undercapitalized banks can be a 
major cause of crisis. Proper regulation of the financial system is important in terms 
of mobilizing capital, giving depositors more confidence in the banking system and 
improving allocation of investment. Moving beyond the realm of financial regulation, 
state support for education is considered to be critical in supplying high quality 
manpower. Furthermore, states should provide infrastructure or should, at least, 
ensure through regulatory action the private provision of infrastructural services such 
as transportation at reasonable prices. The fact that states can play a vital role in 
developing and transmitting technology (such as agricultural extension services) is 
also recognized. Finally, states can help promote equality and alleviate poverty, 
acknowledging the fact that such policies in East Asia have contributed to overall 
growth. 
 
Hence, a certain similarity can be detected between the PWC and the structuralist 
logic underlying national developmentalism that preceded the neo-liberal area. Market 
failures are considered as important and they need to be corrected by active state 
interventionism. Yet, the logic of the PWC goes one step further than national 
developmentalism in line with the neo-liberal critique by focusing on the question of 
how to improve the performance of the state and avoid ‘government or state failure’ 
in the first place. The important contribution by Stiglitz in this respect is by 
highlighting the fact that the effectiveness of states can be improved by using market-
like mechanisms. An interesting symmetry is established by noting that states are  16  
important for the effective functioning of markets but also markets or market-like 
mechanisms are important for the effective functioning of states themselves.  
 
The importance of the market for improving the performance of the state embodies 
the following crucial elements. Firstly, internal incentive structure and reward systems 
are critical for improving the quality of state bureaucracy. Secondly, competition is 
crucial to governmental efficiency; states can help to stimulate competition and 
benefit from competition themselves. States can create competing public agencies and 
encourage private firms to compete with public agencies. Indeed, competition is 
arguably more important than private ownership per se. State-owned firms have 
managed to perform as effectively as private firms when they have been subjected to 
competitive pressures. Hence, privatization at all cost that fails to pay sufficient 
attention to competition and ignores the role of a proper regulatory infrastructure is 
inconsistent with the logic of the PWC. 
 
There is a clear recognition that the international economy during the recent era fails 
to provide a sufficiently attractive environment for development. Private capital flows 
to the south are heavily concentrated in certain countries. Aid flows have experienced 
a drastic decline in recent years and continued restrictions by developed countries 
over market access in key areas like agriculture continue to constitute a major barrier 
to developing country exports. The basic precepts of the PWC are thus not confined to 
the domestic sphere but also embody an international dimension. Industrialized 
countries can contribute to development by increasing aid and market access to LDC 
products.  
 
In retrospect, a key element that distinguishes the PWC from the early neo-liberal 
agenda involves recognition of the importance of a change in institutions as an 
essential component of the new development strategies. Creating effective institutions 
becomes part and parcel of successful development. Similarly, much more emphasis 
is given to social and income distributional consequences of economic policies. For 
example, improved education and health are not only mere instruments in terms of 
increasing growth but also constitute ends in themselves. In achieving fiscal discipline 
attention is centered on where expenditure cuts are concentrated. It is recognized that  17  
if deficit reduction is achieved through cuts in government expenditures in education 
and health then growth will be jeopardized.  
 
Finally, the growing recognition of the importance of democratic regimes in creating 
transparent and accountable states becomes one of the hallmarks of the emerging 
PWC. This aspect again sharply differentiates the PWC from the earlier days of the 
Washington Consensus. The early, hard-line versions of neo-liberal thinking, in line 
with its Hayekian political economy foundations, had clearly underestimated the 
importance of democracy and democratic institutions in the effective implementation 
of the reform process. Indeed, there was an active attempt to depoliticize the 
economic decision-making process if not the society at large and restrict the domain 
of democracy as a means of fostering the smooth and speedy implementation of 
market-based economic reforms. The subsequent experience in many parts of the 
world ranging from Latin America to post-communist Eastern Europe has clearly 
demonstrated the economic costs of attempting to combine neo-liberal economics 
with illiberal democratic forms of governance with the costs manifesting themselves 
in the form of widespread corruption and state failure.
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The Emerging Post-Washington Consensus in Critical Perspective  
 
There is no doubt that the kind of synthesis that forms the intellectual basis of the 
PWC represents a considerable improvement over the rather simplistic neo-liberal 
understanding of development that had constituted the very basis of the earlier 
Washington Consensus. Not only is the need for an active role for the state in dealing 
with important market failures, most notably in the realm of finance, is duly 
recognized, but also attention is given to the fundamental issue of how to improve the 
performance of the state itself in trying to overcome market failures. The latter issue 
certainly had not received any serious attention in the pre-neo-liberal era in the age of 
national developmentalism. Structuralist development theorists had assumed that ‘the 
state’ or ‘planners’ would always act in a benign fashion in the public interest, failing 
to consider the political and institutional pre-requisites for effective state intervention 
in the process. The new synthesis embodied in the PWC clearly represented progress 
over the structuralist and neo-liberal formulations by trying to tackle the question of  18  
how to improve the performance of the market and the state simultaneously through 
their mutual interaction. 
 
Additional strengths of the new synthesis embodied in the PWC lay in the recognition 
of the crucial role that institution-building and democratic governance can play in the 
process of successful development, elements that had been woefully neglected by the 
neo-liberal hardliners. Similarly, the PWC represented a more refined understanding 
of development through a shift of focus from an exclusive and single-minded concern 
with growth and efficiency to a more nuanced understanding of development that 
emphasized the importance of additional policies to deal with key social problems 
such as pervasive unemployment, poverty, and inequality.  
 
In spite of the obvious strengths associated with the emerging PWC outlined above, a 
closer investigation also reveals some of its rather striking limitations, particularly as 
this new line of thinking is put into actual practice by the key international 
organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. We believe that the 
following limitations of the PWC are especially worth highlighting. 
 
Firstly, in the practical application of the new policy agenda one may clearly diagnose 
a systematic bias towards domestic reforms as opposed to systemic or global reforms. 
For example, the IMF, in line with the new thinking has been emphasizing in recent 
years the importance of regulatory reforms, particularly with reference to banking and 
finance. Clearly, one can detect a shift in the IMF’s approach away from a single-
minded concern with short-term stabilization to longer-term structural and 
institutional reforms designed to improve the performance of the market mechanism 
over time. Yet, at the same time, the IMF has been totally impervious to suggestions 
involving the implementation of heterodox policy instruments such as temporary 
short-term capital controls that have proved to be quite successful in certain national 
contexts.
28 Indeed, the IMF has been impervious to any kind of suggestion that 
attempts to deal with endemic financial crises in the semi-periphery as a global market 
failure would necessarily require global measures such as an internationally 
coordinated (Tobin) tax on short-term capital flows as an integral part of  reforming 
the international financial structure. It is fair to say that both the IMF and the World 
Bank tend to locate the principal source of frequent financial crises squarely in the  19  
domestic political economies of the debtor countries concerned.
29 Hence, the focal 
point of their attention becomes that of improving the regulatory structures of the 
countries concerned at the expense of all other considerations.  
 
Yet, self-interest and power relations as the overriding factor in the history of 
international economic relations have been much in evidence also in the post-Second 
World War period. The hierarchy in economic and political power has been the key 
determinant of economic outcomes not only between developed and developing 
countries but also among the developed countries themselves with power relations 
from the most powerful in the center circle spreading to the periphery in the form of 
concentric circles. The conflicts between the United States and Japan and Germany on 
trade and exchange rate issues are well documented. The dominance of developed 
countries in the world economy is extensive, encompassing production, finance, trade, 
and technology. For example, the fact that over 90 percent of all patents originates in 
these countries point to their technological supremacy. Two-thirds of world trade is 
controlled by only 500 transnational corporations (TNCs), originating again mostly 
from these countries.
30 As developing countries seem to have entered a race amongst 
each other to attract foreign investment at all cost, governments even in developed 
countries seem to be facing difficulties in coping with the growing power of these 
enterprises. Despite the considerable progress developing countries have made 
towards trade liberalization in recent years, developed countries have been slow in 
replicating this in terms of granting increased market access for developing country 
exports.   
 
In the hierarchic power relations as dominated by self-interest, the demands of 
developing countries for a more democratic international economic environment has 
fallen on deaf ears even when these countries could raise a united and  powerful voice 
in 1974 for the creation  of a New International Economic Order. The radical reform 
of the international economic system may, in principle, be still relevant for the 
emergence of an international environment more conducive to development. In 
particular, the need to democratize international financial institutions to give them a 
pro-Third World orientation and to establish effective international mechanisms for 
the regulation of TNCs with the objective of curbing their monopoly power and for 
controlling the massive short term capital flows as a source of short-term instability in  20  
developing countries emerge among the most pressing issues in this respect. However, 
the prospects for developing countries to repeat even this abortive challenge now is 
rather slim, given the deep divisions among them and the increasingly lopsided 
international power structure.  
 
Our emphasis on lopsided power relations in the international sphere should not in the 
least detract attention from equally pressing issues on the domestic front which are 
also sidelined by the PWC. The latter’s emphasis on independent regulatory bodies 
with the objective of preventing political interference ignores the formidable obstacles 
they may face in societies dominated by powerful vested interest groups, blocking 
their effective operation. Although there has been some progress towards democracy 
within individual developing countries, the political obstacles blocking the spread of 
the benefits of development to the lower strata of population are far being removed. 
The state may not fulfill even its limited role under the PWC as the weakening of the 
state apparatus and more importantly the very notion of effective state intervention 
have been substantially eroded under neo-liberalism. Another factor to be taken into 
account in this respect is that the neo-liberal bombardment and practice of the past 
two decades may have had a lasting impact on state agents and officials alike, 
impairing their ability to readjust to a new agenda involving fresh thinking at least in 
certain spheres, such as poverty alleviation. It is, therefore natural to expect that 
efforts of national governments in the direction of poverty alleviation and more equal 
income distribution are not likely to make a significant impact unless the obstacles in 
the way of the poor and the underprivileged to express themselves as a powerful 
political force are removed.  
 
Secondly, one may pose the question of how sincere is the renewed concern of key 
Bretton Woods institutions with income distribution and poverty alleviation. A whole 
set of issues needs to be considered in this context including the feasibility of 
significant redistribution within the broad fiscal constraints of neo-liberal re-
structuring. Here, one also needs to make a firm distinction between rhetoric and 
action. The proponents of the PWC, in particular the Bretton Woods Institutions seem 
to shy away from carrying out a balanced analysis of the neo-liberal globalization 
process, in particular from identifying the channels that lead up to the marginalization 
of whole regions and large sections of population within the developing countries  21  
from the benefits of this process. They also ignore mounting evidence linking 
progress in poverty alleviation crucially with a whole set of distributional issues, 
including ownership patterns. It cannot be viewed as a sheer coincidence that the 
attempts to link these considerations with poverty in the preparation of the World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2000-2001 should meet the opposition of the 
higher echelons of power, including the US Treasury, leading to the resignation of the 
chairman of the team preparing the report, Ravi Kanbur.
31   Proponents of the PWC 
emphasize the importance of increased capital flows, including official aid, and 
market access for countries of the south. As the reform of key international 
institutions has been on the agenda over a period of three decades with little progress, 
serious question marks can also be raised about the possibility of translating the 
favorable rhetoric on poverty and income distribution into action in the presence of 
severe domestic and international constraints.  
 
One should also take into account the fact that poverty and inequality issues are 
effectively sidelined in emerging markets like Argentina and Turkey that experience 
financial crises on a frequent basis. The IMF becomes the dominant external actor in 
the context of such countries, with the World Bank typically relegated into secondary 
status. Given the focus of the IMF on short-term adjustment and regulatory reforms, 
conditions relating directly to poverty and inequality fail to be incorporated into its 
stand-by programs in these countries. In fact, the obsession of these programs with the 
creation of a primary budget surplus necessarily interferes with social sector spending 
and no doubt raises serious doubts about the sincerity of the IMF on the poverty 
alleviation issue.  In fact, one gets the strong impression that the Bretton Woods 
Institutions are effectively using the poverty issue as a pretext for broadening and 
deepening the neo-liberal agenda.  
 
Thirdly, the ability to increase employment is of crucial significance not only for 
economic reasons but also for maintaining social cohesion in the countries concerned. 
The employment issue, however, as an explicit objective in its own right, is not 
sufficiently emphasized by the PWC. This neglect can be traced more broadly to the 
capture of domestic economic policy agendas of most developing countries by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions. Even countries that do not have formal agreements with 
these organizations seem to have been carried away with a vague globalization  22  
objective and seem to be devoid of all forms of national development objectives. The 
international economic environment at present is not conducive to successful 
industrialization of developing countries not least because national governments have 
lost the bulk of the tools they have traditionally used towards this objective and 
neither the Washington Consensus nor the PWC has cited it among the list of their 
priorities for these countries. In the same vein, crucial decisions concerning the need 
to develop a strong domestic technological base are also effectively relegated to the 
background. This means that the primary emphasis on obtaining technology is 
implicitly placed on foreign investors, limiting the crucial role that domestic actors 
can play in the realm of increasing domestic technological capabilities Yet the 
experience of successful countries have shown that a high investment rate, emphasis 
on industrialization through selective and targeted industrial policies in capital 
intensive and skill-and technology-intensive activities with a high domestic value 
added content as propelled by rapid export growth have been the key to their success.   
 
The poor record of the neo-liberal model in generating employment may be traced to 
some of the internal inconsistencies of the policy package that it involves. The 
emphasis on financial liberalization and the windfall gains it has offered through 
speculation and risk-taking have meant the accumulation of economic surplus in the 
hands of rentiers, a class of people not renown for their enthusiasm for industrial 
investment. Without investment in directly producing sectors, shear reliance on 
extending neoclassical wisdom to this sphere through emphasis on labor market 
flexibility is not likely to generate employment on a scale sufficient to alleviate the 
immense pressures on the supply side of labor markets and bring about a significant 
turnaround in the prospects of unskilled labor. The concern of PWC with education 
and human capital formation is justified but is not sufficient. Both the demand and 
supply sides of the labor market need to be taken into account. Education fetishism 
results in a certain lack of emphasis on key issues that are directly relevant to the 
debate on employment prospects. For example, the existence of a large pool of highly- 
educated manpower without sufficient growth in directly producing sectors like 
manufacturing to provide productive employment for them may represent a source of 
unemployment and brain drain. Likewise, the absence of global redistributive 
mechanisms and the fact that channels of international migration for unskilled or  23  
semi-skilled labor are largely closed are issues which tend to be underplayed in 
discussions pertaining to employment prospects in the south. 
 
Fourthly, the PWC is associated with a rather unbalanced approach towards the 
regulation of TNCs which constitute highly powerful actors in the world economy. 
The common element in the Washington Consensus and the PWC is to relieve the 
TNCs from regulation by host states. Yet, TNCs, by definition are large oligopolistic 
firms that wield considerable economic and political power exercised on a global 
scale. Hence, their activities need to be regulated also at the global level. A balanced 
approach towards the regulation of TNCs, involving also the interests of those of the 
consumers and host countries fails to receive the kind of attention that it deserves in 
the emerging agenda of the PWC. 
 
Fifth, it seems that the key Bretton Woods institutions will continue to play a  
prominent role in the implementation of the PWC as they have done under the 
Washington consensus. This may lead to the justifiable charge that these institutions 
which may be held responsible for much of the damage under neo-liberal reforms are 
again put in the driving seat in a process set up to rectify it.  Such a choice is 
problematic on several counts, arising largely from the big credibility gap that exists 
between these organizations and the development community at large.  
 
Although we do not have full knowledge of the decision-making processes within the 
Bretton Woods institutions, it is fair to assume that they are not monolithic 
organizations representing a high degree of agreement within major segments in their 
internal structures. The shift in World Bank policy from basic needs to structural 
adjustment in the 1980s and back to poverty in the 1990s and the more recent changes 
within the IMF broadening their agenda to encompass governance issues are cases in 
point  These changes reflected as much the balance of power within the organization 
as the interests of hegemonic countries as determined by changing international 
environment, leading to the serious charge that these organizations act in the interests 
of these countries most notably the United States. The Washington Consensus itself 
may have been molded by these institutions with a close eye on US interests.
32 More 
specifically, one could argue that the primary concerns of the US were to achieve 
market access for American exports as well as preventing the emergence of major  24  
breakthroughs in industrialization that would threaten US industry over time as Japan 
and South Korea had so successfully done in the past. Policy shifts towards foreign 
trade liberalization and export orientation in much of the developing countries through 
neo-liberal reforms under the auspices of Bretton Woods Institutions, for example, has 
thus been linked as much with the competitiveness problems of US industry and 
increasing the debt-repayment capacity of these countries as with growth and 
efficiency considerations associated with greater export-orientation.  More recently, 
there were widespread press reports that IMF support of Turkish stabilization efforts 
were linked with Turkish stance vis-a-vis US policy in the Iraqi conflict.  
 
The current emphasis of these organizations on democratic governance is hardly 
consistent with their past record. Turkey’s adoption of neo-liberal policies in early 
1980 in close collaboration with the World Bank (through successive structural 
adjustment loans) and the IMF through a three year stand-by agreement, for example, 
took place against the background of a repressive military regime. The fact that the 
two institutions did not have any scruples in working in tandem with the military 
regime and were silent when key democratic institutions and activities of powerful 
NGOs were severely curbed has understandably reduced their credibility with respect 
to their efforts to play the role of champions of democracy shortly thereafter. The fact 
that in the drawing up of structural adjustment loan agreements which represented by 
far the biggest transformation of Turkish economic policies the World Bank kept a 
low profile was hardly consistent with the precepts of good governance. Likewise, a 
great deal of secrecy surrounded the standby-agreements that Turkey signed with the 
IMF during this period. The association of the rise of neo-liberal policies in tandem 
with authoritarian regimes is not of course in the least confined to the Turkish case, 
with Chile in after 1973 and Argentina after 1976, presenting other notable cases. 
 
In their basic structures and decision-making processes and other operations these 
institutions hardly obey the stipulations of good governance which has justifiably led 
to calls that they should set an example by applying standards of good governance 
such as transparency, accountability and participation to themselves.
33 To the extent 
that implementation of neo-liberal policies have through the deliberate weakening of 
the state apparatus and encouragement of rent-seeking have contributed to corruption, 
these institutions now find themselves again in the paradoxical situation of repairing  25  
the damage to which they themselves contributed in no small way. The deliberate 
depoliticization of society at all levels through repressive regimes in Turkey and 
elsewhere was crucially needed for neo-liberal reforms to take root. It also probably 
explains the weakness of the opposition to neo-liberal policies and the inability to 
provide a viable alternative to these policies. However, the same process of 
depoliticization is perhaps also and somewhat paradoxically responsible for the slow 
progress towards the emergence of effective NGOs and transparency and good 
governance in public administration that these institutions emphasize at the present 
juncture.  
 
The World Bank as admittedly the more developmental of the key Bretton Woods 
institutions needs to explain why it has been silent on the poverty issue throughout the 
1980s when neo-liberal policies implemented during this period did a great deal of 
damage in this sphere.
34 Even after the re-emergence of poverty alleviation as a major 
objective during the past decade, the record of these institutions in this sphere has not 
closed the credibility gap. The fact that the recent Turkish economic program drawn 
and implemented in close collaboration with the IMF in the midst of a deep economic 
crisis with a devastating impact on poverty was silent in this respect is a case in point. 
Likewise, the efforts of the World Bank have fallen far short of what was needed to 
come to grips with the problem. In fact the strength of the commitment of these 
organizations to the poverty alleviation objective is itself highly questionable giving 
the impression that they have used the poverty alleviation objective to cope with the 




The ability of Bretton Woods Institutions to come to grips with the problems faced by 
developing countries has been increasingly questioned in recent years. The failure of 
the IMF during the past decade in such crucial spheres as the prediction and 
prevention of short-term economic crises in various parts of the world and in 
effectively dealing with them once they emerge has been a source of major criticism, 
with serious questions raised about the future of these organizations.
36 The failure of 
the IMF in particular to learn from past mistakes provided additional ammunition for 
the critics and contributed to the erosion of confidence for this organization. For 
example, in Turkey, the IMF like domestic policy-makers has not drawn the necessary  26  
lessons about the hazards of financial liberalization without sufficient regulation and 
legal safeguards. As a result, capital account liberalization after 1989 resulted in 
successive financial crises with dire consequences. Domestic financial liberalization 
per se was not immune from financial crises either as the “bankers’ crisis” of 1982 
had clearly testified. Likewise, the IMF by not warning the Turkish policy-makers 
about the risks and dangers of overexposure to short-term external capital before the 
successive crises of the past decade has proven to have a short memory as  the 
Turkish crisis of the late 1970s could also be traced to a similar phenomenon..  
 
The involvement of these institutions during neo-liberal restructuring has been 
extended to most developing countries in a broad range of policy areas. This together 
with the broadening of their conditionality, now extending also into the political 
sphere has been instrumental in eroding self reliance and domestic problem solving 
ability in these countries. One could argue that the excessive involvement of the IMF 
in the domestic policy-making process of individual countries and the uniform set of 
conditions imposed regardless of the respective institutional and political capacities of 
individual countries has effectively prevented countries from generating appropriate 
domestic responses to their problems, undermining also learning in the process of 
institution building. Perhaps in certain circumstances reform could only be engineered 
in a top-down fashion. Yet, the top-down approach has led to a situation where 
reforms have been engineered without generating the requisite social consensus, 
hence undermining the longer-term viability of the reform process and the 
effectiveness of some of the key regulatory institutions imposed in a top-down 
fashion. 
 
Finally, the PWC places major importance on the creation of transparent and 
accountable institutions as a basis for improved economic performance. The focus of 
attention, however, is on creating transparent and accountable institutions at the 
domestic level within the domain of the individual nation state. The same kind of 
concern with creating transparent and accountable institutions does not seem to extend 
to the international sphere. Issues concerning how to make the IMF, the World Bank 
and the WTO more transparent and hence democratically accountable in their 
operations as well as problems arising from their power structure as dominated by  27  
developed country interests receives only cursory attention by the intellectual 
proponents of the PWC as well these institutions themselves. 
 
All these considerations point towards a deeper, more fundamental problem that lies 
at the heart of the emerging PWC, namely the inability or unwillingness to address 
major issues pertaining to power and its distribution both at the domestic and 
international levels. Clearly, the emerging PWC represents the response by the 
dominant establishment to the deficiencies of the neo-liberal agenda and an attempt 
by them to overcome such deficiencies through a set of reforms that takes the existing 
structures of power as given. This could be justified on the grounds of what is 
practical and feasible in terms of improving economic performance, in the short-run. 
Yet, in the long-run, such reforms may represent a partial and insufficient response 
given the scale and depth of the problems involved as headed by pressing issues like 
increased unemployment, poverty and inequality at the global level. 
 
Concluding Observations  
 
The very foundations of the neo-liberal orthodoxy that informed the thinking of the 
key Bretton Woods institutions have been dramatically shaken in the context of the 
1990s. The process of neo-liberal restructuring has been associated with a weak 
growth performance, persistent poverty, rising inequality and endemic crises with 
costly ramifications. It was also striking to observe that countries which have been 
performing better than average have typically been countries that have managed to 
deviate from rigid neo-liberal norms in certain critical respects. Consequently, the 
dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm has been challenged both from the center and 
the periphery, in other words from within and outside the dominant academic and 
policy-making establishment. Undoubtedly, it was criticism within the establishment 
that was decisive in the gradual progression towards a new kind of consensus among 
the key international financial institutions, aptly labeled as the Post-Washington 
Consensus. The intellectual contributions of scholars like Stiglitz also played a critical 
role in this respect.  
 
The basic precepts of the emerging post-Washington Consensus represent a novel 
synthesis of the two previously dominant paradigms in development theory and  28  
policy, namely national developmentalism with its emphasis on the critical role of the 
state in overcoming market failures and neo-liberalism with its unfettered belief in the 
benefits of the free market. The new approach recognizes the importance of the state 
in the context of open markets and a more liberal policy environment. But, at the same 
time, it recognizes the need to avoid state failure which in turn, requires institutional 
innovation and democratic governance. Furthermore, the new approach places 
significant weight on the need to tackle poverty and inequality issues, as objectives in 
their own right, hence, moving away from an exclusive pre-occupation with growth 
and efficiency objectives at all cost. In all these respects, the emerging PWC 
represents a more progressive approach to development as compared with the naïve 
and unqualified application of the Washington Consensus. 
 
Nevertheless, important limitations may also be detected in the emerging PWC itself. 
A central criticism is that the emerging PWC adopts a rather narrow and technocratic 
approach towards state-market interactions at both the national and global levels. It 
takes the existing power structure as pre-determined. Hence, it fails to address the 
fundamental power relations and asymmetries of power that exist between classes at 
the level of the nation state and powerful versus less powerful states in the global 
economy although it is  these very power relations that need to be challenged if key 
development issues are to be tackled in a comprehensive manner. In this context, the 
horizons of both the World Bank and the IMF tend to be rather limited. 
 
For more immediate and practical purposes, however, it is also important to recognize 
that the broad agenda of the emerging PWC is not equally shared or welcomed by 
both of these institutions. There is no doubt that the IMF has experienced a serious 
identity crisis after the Asian crisis and has been trying to reform itself perhaps more 
intensively than at any other time in its history. Nonetheless, the IMF has a more 
restrictive vision or understanding of what ought to be the fundamental components of 
the new PWC. For practical purposes, this has an important implication. The IMF 
continues to be the dominant actor notably for the more advanced, crisis-ridden 
‘emerging markets’ of the semi-periphery, with the World Bank with its more 
progressive vision of the PWC occupying only a secondary and supporting role in 
such contexts. The focus of the Fund on short-term financial discipline and regulatory 
reforms therefore constitutes a serious additional constraint on the application of some  29  
of the more progressive elements of the PWC, designed to deal with poverty, 
inequality and the longer-term competitiveness of national economies. Likewise, 
industrialization which was the overriding development objective under national 
developmentalism was wiped out of the agenda under neo-liberalism. There is no sign 
that this objective will be reactivated under the PWC. Yet the historical experience of 
developed countries as well as those of successful industrializers in the Third World 
has provided sufficient evidence that progress in this sphere goes hand in hand with 
developing domestic technological capabilities and generating employment. 
 
The spread of neo-liberal ideas to developing countries as well as the post-communist 
transition economies has gone a long way in reinforcing the view that there was no 
alternative to these policies. The criticism leveled against these ideas by the emerging 
Post-Washington Consensus while falling drastically short of coming to grips with the 
main issues involved still represents a large crack in the neo-liberal armory and may 
lead to fresh thinking and accelerate the search for viable alternatives. The questions 
of whether the emerging Post-Washington Consensus together with the flourishing 
alternative globalization movement against the background of increasing 
distributional imbalances at all levels will bring about such an outcome or indeed if 
they do, how soon remains at this stage a matter for conjecture. 
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building in the development process, see World Bank (1993). On transition 
economies, see World Bank (1996), and on the state, see, World Bank (1997).  
23 See, for example, the speeches made by Stanley Fischer (2002) who as the Vice-
President at the Fund played an active role in this self-evaluation process following 
the Asian crisis. Available at Stanley Fischer Biographical Information IMF web 
page, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/sf.htm>.  
24 Among the influential contributions in this context see, Rodrik (1999, 1997), 
Krugman (1990), Easterly (2001).  
25 The key elements of his criticisms concerning the IMF have been summarized in 
Stiglitz (2002). The fact that he was awarded the Nobel Prize during this period 
undoubtedly played an important role in the publicity that he received for his views. 
26 For a useful exposition of the basic propositions associated with the PWC, see, 
Stiglitz (2001). 
27 For an attempt to deconstruct the costly consequences of trying to implement neo-
liberal reform in the context of an illiberal democracy with reference to the Özal era in 
Turkey, see, Öniş (2003). 
28 Reference to the fact that some IMF officials have recognized that controls over 
short-term capital flows might have played a positive role in avoiding financial crises 
in Malaysia and Chile. In this context , see, Ariyoshi et al. (2000: 22-3, 26-8, 37) and 
Robinson (1999). Nevertheless, the IMF has been rather unreceptive to the kind of 
arguments representative of views from the ‘periphery’ such as Wade (1998) that 
emphasize the global causes of emerging market crises and, hence, the reform of the 
international financial architecture with special emphasis on capital controls. 
29 See, Armijo (2001) in this context.  
30  See Kozul-Wright (2003). 
31  See Wade (2001c) and Kanbur (2001). 
32  Gore (2000:790) seems to suggest such a link.  
33 See Woods (2000). 
34  See Şenses ( 2001: 39-44). 
35 In the Turkish case for example the extension of neoliberal reforms in the domain 
of agriculture, social security and the labor market has been closely linked with this 
objective.  
36 The American Economic association annual meeting in 2003 had a special session 
on this subject. See American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings, May, 
2003.  32  
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